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PROBLEMS WITH GRAHAM'S
TWO-SYSTEMS HYPOTHESIS
OWEN GOL DI N

1.

S, and S2

I NAristotle's Two S.ystems 1 Daniel G raham has put forward a bold new
hypothesis concerning the development of Aristotle's thought, which
he labels 'the Two Systems Hypothesis'. G raham recognizes that the
interpreter of Aristotle faced with conflicting doctrines sometimes has
no recourse but to posit a development in Aristotle's thought. But, with
the notable exception of the speculations of Owen,2 Graham finds
previous developmental accounts of Aristotle's thought philosophically
unsatisfactory. T his is because genetic accounts (like those ofJaeger)3
have typically explained changes in Aristotelian doctrine on the basis of
a shift in general outlook, not on Aristotle's attempts as a philosopher
to resolve tensions arising in his earlier views. Graham's book is an
attempt to give a developmental account of Aristotle's thought in
metaphysics and philosophy of scien ce without this shortcoming.
Graham argues that Aristotle's positing of matter was m otivated by
the failure of his earlier ontology to allow one to account for substantial
change and that the analysis of substance as a composite of matter and
fo rm is structprcd by the model of the activity of a craftsman. G raham
shows how the theory of the four causes as it is presented in Physics 2 is
also structured by this model and how the potentiality/actuality
distinction was extended to apply to Aristotle's new understandin g
of substantial change. Graham's account both explains. apparent
discrepancies in Aristotle's views and shows why Aristotle was
1

(Oxford, 1987).
See G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in
I. During and G. E. 1.. Owen (eds.), AristoJie and Plato in the Mid- Fourth Cent111)'
(Gi:iteborg, 1960}, and ' The Platonism of Aristotle', Pmrmlings tlthe Aristotelian Sorie~v.
1

89 ( 196s). 125-so.
: Sec \\'. jaeger, Aristotle: Fundmnentals of the 1/istory of his Droelopmmt, trans.
R. Robinson, 2nd cdn ., (Oxford, 1948).
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philosophically impelled to <.: hangc his views in the manner in which he
did. There is much of value here, and y raham's speculations arc
worthy of close consideration. But here I shall restrict myself t~ just
one of Graham's basic points, that which is announced in his book's
very title: the hypothesis that in Aristotle's writings we find two
complete, independent, and contradictory philosophical systems, each
with its own ontology and theory of scientific explanation.
The aspect of this thesis that is bound to be the most controversial is
the contention that Aristotle's first system (S ,), found in the Organon,
is not ·only different from, but fundamentally contradicts his second
system (S 2 ), which dominates the rest of Aristotle's wo rk. In Graham's
view there is 'a fault line running down the middle of Aristotle's
philosophy' (p. viii). He argues that Aristotle never recognized that his
philosophkal thought underwent such a radical shift, and hence at
times imports the obsolete principles of S, into the philosophical
speculations of S 2 • Graham suggests that this is bound to cause
trouble, since at these times Aristotle's conceptual framework rests on
a set of contradictory principles. Graham leads up to an analysis of
the metaphysical ·puzzles of Metaphys£cs Z, which he takes to
be a manifestation of the philosophical confusions that arise from
Aristotle's holding contradictory principles. According to G raham's
analysis, Aristotle knows that he is in trouble, but does not know
the solution-which would be to cut the problem out by the roots,
i.e. eliminate the principles of S 1 from his thought. In the penultimate chapter of An"stotle's Two Systems G raham shows 'what Aristotle
should have said' by sketching the m etaphysics of a consistent
version of s2.
.
Alth0ugh I am pc;:rsuaded by the general outline of Graham's
developmental account, I believe that his analysis of the logical relation
between sI and s2 is flawed, and that the difficulties of Metapi~)ISics z
are deeper than Graham suggests. Therefore I s hall restrict my
comments to these points. I shall firs~ outline some essential
differences Graham detects between s I and s2. I shall then argue that
the two systems are not contradictory in the manner G raham suggests;
rather, s2 is a deeper and mote elaborate account which contains
all of the teachings of the 'higher-level' S ,. In the terminology of
contemporary philosophy of science, sI is reducible to s2. Next, I shall
tum to the shift in Aristotle's theory of explanation detected by
Gra_ham. I shall claim that to strip the philosophy of science of S 2 of
the presuppositions of S, would be to have Aristotle abandon his ideal
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of ultimate explanation, and that there is no evidence that Aristotle was
ever tempted to move in this direction.
Graham presents the theses of each of'Aristotle's two systems' in a
succinct table (pp. 8o- 1). H ere I shall mention only those theses
directly relevant to the discussion at hand.
The root difference between S , and S 2 is one of ontology. In S.,
which Graham calls Atomic Substantialism, the basic things in the
world arc the primary substances of the Categories. These are those
concrete substances that we run across in our everyday experience:
biological entities and other middle-sized things which fall under
certain n atural kinds (p. 26). In S 2 , which Graham calls Hylomorphic
Substantialism, the theoretically basic entities are no longer such
middle-sized concrete substances. Rather, concrete substances arc
themselves to be analysed as complexes of form and matter, and,
according to Metaphysics Z, it is form that is ultim~tely to be identified
with primary substance (pp. s8-62).
While .both s1 and s2 espouse the independence of 'primary
substance', what is meant by this phrase differs in each of the two
theoretical discourses. In S, the term 'primary substance' refers to the
same beings as does the, phrase 'concrete substance', which is the term
Graham employs in summarizing S 2 to refer to perceptible entities
not be the concrete substance Socrates
. such as Socrates. In S 2 it
who serves as a foundation of being, but what S 2 would consider the
corresponding primary substance, Socrates' form (p. 6o). Graham
expresses the basic difference in the ontologies of sI and s2by the
following principles: SA ·(belonging to S ,), that 'primary substances arc
ontologically indivisible particulars', and H (belonging to S 2 ), that 'the
concrete s ubstance is composed of form amJ matter' (p. 18o).
As G raham sees it, this djffercnce in ontology has repercussions in
the philosophy of science. The central principle of the theory of
explanation ofS, is labelled SK: 'scientific knowledge is demonstrative
knowledge.' Tttat is to say, scientific knowledge comes about through a
certain kind of deduction called a demonstration, whose premisses arc
'self-evident' and exhibit the cause of the fact expressed in the
conclusion of the demonstration (pp. 47-8). D emonstrations arc so
structured that this cause will be expressed in the demonstration's
middle term, 'the missing link in a chain of universals exhibited by the
tcm1s of a sequence of syllogisms in a projected demonstrative proof'
(p. so). Since by and large those premisses which ultimately ground
demonstrations arc definitional, expressing the essences of objects of

will

..

OnJen Goldin

206

scientific inquiry, demonstrations serve to identify the sort of cause
indicated in Post. An. 2. I I, 94a3 4-6, which Graham labels ' the
essential cause'.-~ Graham argues that, despite Aris totle's best efforts in
Post. A n. 2. 1 1 to show otherwise, the essential cause is the only kind of
cause that can be m ade manifest through the demonstrative scheme of
s, (pp. 158-63).
In S 2 , as Graham sees it, Aristotle adopts a deeper notion of
scientific explanation. In this system one adequately explains a fact
through identifying each of the four causes d escribed in Phys. 2. 3·
According to Graham, the rigid notion of demonstrations grounded in
the identification of and deduction from essences plays no part here.
Rather, in this sort of explanation the relevant metaphysical aspects of
any entity, attribute, or event are isolated and identified. Graham
argues that this notion of scientific explanation had to wait until s2
because its scheme of the four causes is structured around the 'craft
model' which is the motivation of the metaphysics of S 2 • Graham
suggests that this is how one can solve a vexed problem of Aristotelian
scholarship: how to reconcile Aristotle's own prescriptions for
scientific research and exposition in the Posterior Ana~)'tics with the
more discursive accounts actually presented in Aristotle's scientific
researches. According to Graham, Aristotle's scientific treatises arc
part of S 2 , written at a time in which the S, theory of demonstration
was already obsolete (even if Aristotle himself was not aware that this
was so). What we find in these treatises is precisc;ly what Aristotle in
Metapl~ysics A. 3 and Generation nfA nimals 1. 1 says we should find :
the identification of each of the fo ur causes responsible for the
phenomenon unde r consideratio n ( pp. 3 19-2 3).

2.

Is S. an extension of S,?

The crux of G raham's argument is that S, .and S 2 arc two incompatible
alternative philosophical system s. G raham first rejects the traditional
account of the relationship between the Organon and the rest of the
Aristotelian corpus, that which s tates that the former is, as the name
Organon implies, a logical tool to be employed in any discourse
' Graham distinguishes the 'essential cause' ofS, from the ' f(>rmal cause' of 5 2 on the
grounds that the latter notion i~ depend en t on the correlative notions of matter and form,
at)sent from S, (pp. 75-6).
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concerning any s ubject. According to this view, S 1 docs not itself make
any substantive philosophic claims and hence docs not conflict with S2 •
G raham convincingly argues that the Categories docs indeed p resent an
ontology: it gives an account of the basic entities in the world (primary
substances), deriv~tive entities (the various kinds of accidents), and the
relations holding between these (pp. 87-90).
G raham next rejects what he calls the Extension Hypothesis,
concerning the relationship between sI and s2. According to this view,
S 2 is an extension of S, because'S, is only a preliminary statement either because it is simplified for the novice or because it does not yet
take into account the full range of problems that a philosophy has to
confront' (p. go). I shall here review Graham's criticism of the
Extension Hypothesis and in the light of this criticism defend a version
of it.
Graham's argument against the Extension Hypothesis is as follows.
He writes, 'in logical theory, one system is an extension of the other if it
contains .a ll the axioms of the other and at least one new axiom besides'
(p. 91 ). An example of this would be the relationship between plane
geometry and solid geometry. The latter theory is built on the basis of
the former, but has a more encompassing subject-matter. T his is made
possible by additional axjoms which deal with an c>.:panded subjectmatter wi thout contradicting or replacing any of the axioms of the first
theory. 5 Graham argues that this cannot be the relation of S 1 and
S 2 because a principle of S., SA (that 'primary substances arc
ontologically indivisible particulars'), is not only absent from s2 but is
supplanted by the coinradictory principle H (that 'the concrete
. substance is composed of form and matter'). Two systems whose
principles so contradict one another cannot stand in the relation of
theory and extension. Graham likens their relation to that between
Euclidean and Riemannian geometries; each geometry is partially
based on an axiom concerning parallel lines which contradicts the
. axiom of the other. T hey arc incompatible alternatives. So, just as the
geometer must decide whether to adopt one geometry or another
within a given inquiry, the metaphysician must, within the context of a
certain philosophical inquiry, adopt either a theory according to which
the concrete substance is ontologically indivisible or one according to
which it is not. Graham argues that problems of substantial change,
among other considerations, lead Aristotle to a theory of the laner

..
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kind; once Aristotle has arrived at this theory, he can apply the
principles of the former theory only at th,e risk of contradicting himself.
It is certainly the case that principles SA and H are mutually
contradictory, and hence S, cannot be an extension of S 2 in the sense
in which Graham has defined 'extension'. But to posit a theoretical
chasm between the two theories is not the only alternative, and the fact
that Aristotle so deftly leaps from one theory to the other should make
us wary of Graham's proposal. Perhaps S 2 is an extension of S, in a
looser sense. Perhaps the root contradiction Graham detects between
S 1 and S 2 is a function of the manner in which the subject-mancr of S 1
is limited, and it may be that the metaphysical analysis of change that
prompts S 2 need not entail the rejection of the core doctrines of S,. To
see how this is so we need to examine more closely the nature of the
contradiction to which Graham draws our attention.
In S 1 a certain kind, i.e. concrete substance, is posited as basic and
unanalysable. In S 2 that same kind is posited as analysable. Is not the
relation between concrete substance as conceived in S 1 and concrete
substance as conceived in S 2 the same as that between the atom as
conceived in classical chemistry and the atom as conceived in
contemporary physics? In both cases we have on the one hand a theory
in which a certain theoretical enti ty is posited as basic and
unanalysablc and on the other hand a theory in which that same entity
is analysed as a complex of more basic theoretical entities. Although
we might not be able to properly say that contemporary physics is an
extension of classical chemistry, surely we would not want to make the
claim that G raham makes in regard to S, and S 2 : that they arc
incom.mensurablc and incompatible. Rather, the relationship seems to
be that which holds between a science _o r theory and that to which it is
reducible.
What is it for one theoretical system to be reducible to another? If a
theory A is reducible to .a theory B, one must be able to correlate those
entities taken to be basic in A with entities or complexes of entities
taken to be basic in B. Further, by means of these assumptions (which
express the relations holding between the theoretical entities of the two
systems) and the principles of B, one mus-t be able to deduce every
theorem of A. 6 Is this the relation ~at holds between the ontologies of
1
'

Sec Ernest Nagel, 771e Structure a/Science (New York, 1961), 353-4.
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5 1 and 5 2 ?7 There will be only one 'correspondence rule' 11 relating the
ontologies ofS, and 5 2 : that 'primary substance' as employed in 5 1 has
the same reference as 'composite substance' in S 2 , the synthesis of
matter and form. That every primary substance falls under a natural
kind and that such a kind is a species definable as genus and differentia
are theses of S 1 which, properly interpreted , will prese rve their truthvalue in S 2 • The only thesis of 5 1 that will not preserve its truth-value
in 5 2 is what Graham calls SA: that 'primary substances arc
ontologically indivisible particulars'. What are we to make of this
principle (expressed in Cat. 5, 2 3 1 1 - I 3, as 'primary substances arc
neither said of nor in anything else')?
The assertion that a certain entity posited by a theoretical discourse
is not analysable as a complex of more basic entities is not to be taken
as an integral principle of th at discourse. For example, one will not qua
arithmetician identity the monad as the basic _theoretical entity of
arithmetic. This will be the task of the philosopher of science, such as
Aristotle_(cf. Post. An. 1. I , 71 3 15-16; I. 2 , 72a21 - 4 ; 1. 10, 763 34-6).
Similarly, that 'primary substance' is the basic theoretical entity of S 1 is
properly taken not as a thesis of S 1 itself, but of a mctatheoretical
•
discourse ·explicating tl;l~ logical structure of S 1 •
It might be countered d}at in this respect the status of a metaphysical
discourse is unique, for, unlike other sciences, metaphysics itself
purports to give the ultimate analysis of beings. But the notion of First
Philosophy is introduced only in S •. Except for the usc of proti in
regard to concrete substances in the Categories, there is no indication
that the level of analysis presented therein is meant to be ultimate.
I conclude that all that S 1 tells us about the world is also told by 5 2 ,
but S 2 tells us much more. Just as contemporary physics has deepened
the scientific un·d erstanding of the world offered by classical chemistry,
without rejecting classical chemistry as fundamentally incorrect, so
with 5 2 Aristotle has deepened, not rejected, the metaphysical
understanding of the world offered by S 1 • The fact that the one system
takes a certain kind of entity to be basic while the other does not docs

7 I restrict the discussion here of whether I and s2 arc incommensurable to the area
in which G raham finds the core contradiction between them : ontology. The appare nt
incompatibility o f the logic of the two systems (p. 8o) is also easily explained on the
grounds I p resent here. For a discussion of whether the philosophy of science of S 1 is
incompatible with that of 5 2 , sec sect. 3 below.
x On the usc o f this phrase see W. Sellars, 'Theoretical Explanation', in Philosophical
Perspectives (Springfi eld, Ill., 1967), 333·
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not entail the two systems' incompatibility. T he propos1t10n that a
certain theoretical entity cannot be further analysed need not be
considered an assumption within a theory', but rather can be seen as a
fact regardt.ng that theory. If we take the S 1 principle of the ontological
indivisibility of concrete substance as mctathcoretical in this w·ay, the
fundamental contradiction Graham discerns between s I and s2
disappears.
Even if all of the above is admitted, it might be countered that
Graham is sti11 justified in writing of a major conceptual rift between
early and later Aristotle. The principles by which S, is supplemented
arc so radical that S 2 constitutes an entirely new world-view,
employing a different paradigm. T hus, Graham speaks of the
transition between I and S 2 aS a SCientifiC revolution, Similar tO thOSe
discussed by Kuhn.'1 On this view, there is such a conceptual rift
between the two systems that there would be no way to translate the
truths of S, into the vocabulary of 5 2 without doing violence to the
former. Because the first theory is part of a world-view rejected by
the second, the conceptual content of the principle of the first theory,
taken by itself, is different from the conceptual content of the first
theory understood as part of the more encompassing second theory. 10
G raham supports his view that there is a radical conceptual ri ft
between s1and s2 by indicating shifts in meaning in both the terms
and the propositions of the two systems. Graham focuses on the
following example to highlight the incommensurability of the two
systems: According to the ontology of the Categrm'es, the fact that
Socrates is a substance entails that Socrates cannot be either more or
less what he is,·since substance, taken as ontologically basic, does not
admit of the more or the less (Cat. s, 3h33-4a1). But, as Graham
points out, in S 2 an· immature Socrat~s would be 'less of a man', i.e.
less of a substance, than the mature Socrates. (As Aristotle puts it at
M etaph. H. 8, I05o·'4-7, the adult is 'prior in form and substance'.
Because of the conceptual shift between S 1 and S 2 , the above S 1
statement, interpreted in the theoretical framework of S 2 , contradicts
the above statement of 5 2 (IOI-3). So even if partisans of s, and s2
will agree with each other's statement that Socrates is a substance, that

s

'' pp. 93 - 5, 103 . S ec T. Kuhn, 7Yte. Structure of Sdentifir Rt't·olutions, 2nd cdn.
(Chicago, 1970).
~~~ This point is based on my unders tanding of remarks made by G raham at the 1 g8H
U nivers ity of T exas at Austin Works hop in Ant.;cnt Philosophy.
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is only because they do not fully realize what the other side means by
that statement.
·
D ocs the problem not lie in the fact that 'to be more or Jess of a
certain substance' has not in this example been translated from the
idiom of one discourse to that of the other? Were the partisan of S 2 to
understand what the partisan of S 1 means when he denies the
possibility of one substance's being more or less a substance than
another entity, surely he would have no objection. For in denying that
one man can be more or less a man than another, all the partisan of S 1
means is that for every substantial kind, a particular entity either falls
under that kind or it does not. T here is no concern here with the
extent to which cer tain potencies characteristic of that kind have been
actualized; as Graham points out, the notion of form as actuality is
alien to S 1 (pp. g8- roo, 183-206). But this is not because the notion
contradicts anything in S 1 ; it rather belongs to a de~per level of analysis.
Again, just because, within the theoretical structure of a system, an
analysis is neither given nor made possible, this docs not mean that this
is entailed by the core of that system; rather, that there can be no such
analysis ought to be considered a mctatheoretical fact. T he partisan of
S 2 would agree with the partisan of S, that there is a sense in which no
one is either more or le~s human than another, but only S 2 presents the
theoretical fra mework for .discussing the difference in levels in which
certain potencies characteristic of substantial kinds arc actualized. 11

3· Demonstration and explanation in S .
G raham argues that in the philosophy of science, as well as in
metaphysics, Aristotle's thought underwent a fundamental shift. T he
notion of essence, which plays a crucial role in the theory of
explanation of S,, 12 is alien to the craft model of generation, which
11

Cf. the d ifletcncc in t.he Englis h idioms 'A is more of a man than H' and 'A is more
human than B'. While it ..:an be said that I am ' more of a man' than my two-year-old son,
to say that one being is more human than another is properly speaking impossible, for no
human being is more human than any others. The idiom can be e mployed only
metaphorically, e.g. in saying that a human H acts like a robot, not d isplaying certain
h uman faculties that arc indeed possessed, or in sayi ng that a creature A (e.g. a monkey)
displays abilities more like those of human beings than docs creature 13 (e.g. a guineapig).
12 As Burnyeat has argued, demonstrations are explanations: sec M . F. Burnycat,
'Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge' in E. Berti (cd.), Aristotle ou Scieure: 'l11e
Posterior Analytics (Padua, 1981 ), 97- r 39· ' ('hey arc not mere linguistic entities; rather,
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motivates 5 2 • Aristotle employs this model to liken the coming into
being of a substance to the imposition of form on appropriate matter.
In the most developed version of the theory of the four causes this
model is to be employed in scientific explanation. For every object of
inquiry the scientist must seek the analogues to the matter a craftsman
takes up, the form that is imposed on it, the craftsman himself, and the
end the craftsman has in mind (pp. 172-81). Aristotle attempts to
dovetail the two theories by identifying the essence of a thing with its formal cause. As we have seen , Graham holds this identification
partially responsible for the paradoxes of Metapkysics Z. 13
But suppose that Aristotle had adopted a hylomorphic substantialism
free of the theory of explanation presented in the PosLerior Analytics.
What sort of scientific explanation would be possible? There are two
possibilities. Either explanation would be wholly non-deductive or it
would be deductive, without restin g on indemonstrable first principles.
In the first case scientific explanation would come about merely
through the identification of each of the four causes, running down
them in a list, as it were. Any fact complex enough to be inexplicable
through the mere-identification of the formal cause of some substances
would be in principle inexplicable. Take, for example, the biological
fact considered as explmrandum in Post. An. 2. 16- 17: vines shed their
leaves. Aristotle sketches an explanation which would go something
like this: the structure of flat-leaved plants necessitates a congealing of
they arc the vehicle by which there is imparted epistemi (scientific understanding), the
disposition required for answering certain ' why' questions. For this reason, G raham'
( p. 8 1) improperly assigns the thesis BTC ('a cau e is an answer to the que tion Why') to
s2alone.
.
u Graham takes this identification to be responsible for two other philosophical
difficulties as well. T h e ·first is what he calls ' the empirical problem'. When actually
engaged in his b iological researches Aristotle discovers that the ideas of defining
biological kinds through identifYing ge nus and species is unrealistic; in PA 1. 2-4
Aristotle argues that a biological definition may need to present more than one
differentia (245-6). This docs not strike me as evidence o f the obsolescence of the S,
theory of ex'Pianation in the context o f real empirical researc h. Rather, Aristotle is
making a relatively mino r adjustment to the S, theory. The problem that Aristotle finds
in definitions arrived at through dichotomous divisions is lhat such definitions arc
inadequate for grounding scientific exp lanations of the ka/11' !Jauta sumbebikota (the 'in
itself accidcntals') of the dejinimda. On this sec P. Pellegrin, A ristotle's Classijiallion t{
A ninwls: Biolog,, and the Conceptual Unif)' of tlte Aristotelian Corpus, trans. A. Preus
(Berkeley, 1986), 13-49. So Aristotle is ':JOt here challenging the thesis that scientific
ex'Pianarions take the form of demonstrations based on indemonstrable definiti ons. The
second problem ('the analytic problem') concerns the ontological status of genus and
diffe rentia. This docs not seem to me to arise from the clash of contradicting systems; it
arises in S, alone.
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sap at the juncture of the leaf and the stem; a vine is a flat-leaved plant,
so this coagulation will occur in a vine. This in turn will lead to the
vine's having its leaves drop towards the centre of the earth
(the explanation of which fact will presumably be drawn from the
principles of chemistry). Much more is involved here than the simple
identification of each of the four causes. 1"' This explanation is
deductive.
Alternatively, scientific explanations in S 2 could be deductive,
although not demonstrative. That is to say, they would be expressed by
inferences which do not rest on immediate premisses. H ence, the
premisses of these deductions would themselves demand explanation.
This would be to reject ultimacy in explanation, as most contempo rary
philosophers of science have done. This h as the consequence of either
relegating such explanations to instruments allowing one to predict
future events, or of making the scientific understanding that such
explanations afford a relative affair; through them one would
understand more than before, but questions could still be raised
concerning the truths on which th-at explanation is grounded. There is
no evidence that Aristotle had contemplated any such position in his
philosophy of science. Even in S 2 he remains convinced of the ultimate
intelligibility of the important features of the sublunar realm. Given
this conviction, the fundamentals of the theory of explanation offered
in S 1 must find a place in any system of hylomorphic substantialism.
I have here argued that there is no chasm separating S 1 from S 2 ; the
latter is rather the maturation of the former. D espite the negative tenor
of the above remarks; I would like to close by emphasizing what
is of great value in Graham's book. Although sI and s2 may
not be incommensurable, both are indeed comprehensive systems of
metaphysics and philosophy of science. Graham's isolation of the
principles of the two is noteworthy; so is his account of how Aristotle
developed the principles of s2to meet philosophic demands for which
S 1 is inadequate. Although I have not here discussed these chapters of
Graham's book, they contain many intriguing and valuable arguments
worthy of close consideration.
Marquel/e University, Milwaukee
H If we are to adopt an S z free of the presuppositions o f S, we could not even say that
this explanation has identified the formal cause of shedding. For in S., as Graham
conceives it, form has a role only as an ontological componenr of substance, and
shedding is not a substance.

